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"THE UNITED STATES-CHINA ACT OF 1991" 
and CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In June 1989, the world watched as the government of the 
People's Republic of China brought a violent end to pro-democracy 
student protests in Beijing's Tiananmen Square. l The images of a 
lone figure facing a column of tanks and the students' makeshift 
Statue of Liberty have become symbolic expressions of "The Beijing 
Spring."2 The events of that spring, coupled with years of human 
rights abuses in the People's Republic of China and perceived in-
action by the executive branch prompted the United States Con-
gress to pass "The United States-China Act of 1991." The Act 
imposed human rights conditions to the continuance of China's 
Most-Favored-Nation (MFN) status.3 Reacting quickly to Congress' 
I University students began to occupy Beijing's Tiananmen Square in April 1989, dem-
onstrating against the treatment of former party leader Hu Yaobang and expressing doubts 
about China's economic and social conditions. See Jeffrey A. McCredie, Human Rights in the 
People's Republic of China: An Appraisal of Recent Events, 3 TEMP. INT'L & COMPo L.J. 217, 217-
18 (1989). The government imposed martial law in Beijing on May 20, 1989; arrests and 
beatings soon followed. Id. Estimates of casualties ranged from 500 to 1,000, though the 
Chinese government claimed that no deaths occurred in Tiananmen Square. Id. Ultimately, 
over 300,000 troops with tanks were necessary for the government to maintain control in 
Beijing. /d. Participants in the events of Tiananmen Square were arrested and imprisoned; 
reports also circulated that many demonstrators were executed. See generally RUTH CHER-
RINGTON, CHINA'S STUDENTS: THE STRUGGLE FOR DEMOCRACY (1991). 
• See Emily Mac Farquhar, On the Defensive: As Wa~hington Debates Whether to Get Tough, 
China Braces Itself, U.S. NEWS AND WORLD REPORT, May 27, 1991, at 37; see also CHERRINGTON, 
supra note 1, at 151-70. 
S Basically, Most-Favored-Nation (MFN) treatment is an obligation by a state "to treat 
activities of a particular foreign country or its citizens at least as favorably as it treats the 
activities of any other country." JOHN JACKSON, THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM: LAw AND 
POLICY OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS 136 (1989). MFN status entitles China to 
the low tariff rates accorded to all but a few countries by the United States. MacFarquhar, 
supra note 2, at 47. The United States has denied MFN status to many countries that have 
committed serious human rights violations, including Cambodia, Cuba and Vietnam. Robert 
F. Drinan, S.J. & Teresa T. Kuo, The 1991 Battle for Human Rights in China, 14 HUM. RTS. Q. 
21,37 (1992). 
Congress imposed conditions to China's MFN status as a part of "The United States-
China Act of 1991." H.R. 2212, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. (1991). Originally sponsored by 
Representative Nancy Pelosi of California, the bill (H.R. 2212) was passed by the House of 
Representatives on July 10, 1991. H.R. 2212, Bill Tracking Report, March 18, 1992, available 
in LEXIS, Legis Library, Bltrck file. On July 23, the Senate passed its version of the bill. [d. 
The House disagreed with many of the changes; a conference report was eventually presented 
to the Senate on February 25, 1992, at which time "The United States-China Act of 1991" 
was cleared for presentment to United States President George Bush. Id. The bill was 
presented to the President on February 27, 1992, and the House received the President's 
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decision, the Chinese Foreign Ministry asserted, not for the first 
time, that it would not tolerate "interference in China's internal 
affairs."4 
The Chinese government insists that it supports human rights;5 
the factual evidence, however, indicates otherwise.6 For many years, 
China has not been held accountable for human rights violations.7 
"The United States-China Act of 1991" attempted to ameliorate the 
situation in China by imposing conditions to the extension of MFN 
status.8 The issue is a complex one, involving questions of both law 
and policy. This Note, however, focuses on the legal questions, 
including the United States human rights conditions and how they 
reflect international law. 
This Note argues that the United States conditions on China 
did not significantly differ from those prohibitions already bind-
ing China under customary international law, because the viola-
tions involve "the basic issues of freedom of thought, speech, asso-
ciation and assembly, freedom from arbitrary arrest, torture and 
veto on March 3, 1992.ld. For further background to "The United States-China Act of 1991" 
and related" legislation aimed at curbing human rights abuses in China, see Drinan &: Kuo, 
supra, at 30-37. 
4 China Criticizes U.S. on Senate MFN Vote, UPI, July 24, 1991, available in LEXIS, Nexis 
Library, UPI File. 
5 In November 1991, the Chinese government issued a 62-page report, "Human Rights 
in China." Nicholas D. Kristof, China Issues Rebuttal to Human Rights Critics, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 
3, 1991, at A12. According to the N.Y. Times, the report claimed that China actively supports 
human rights, both political and socio-economic rights. Id. The report stated that "there is 
no censorship of Chinese newspapers, that prisoners live in humane conditions ... and that 
the country has no political prisoners." Id. In August 1992, the Chinese government issued 
another report; according to the N.Y. Times, this report claimed that Chinese "prisoners are 
regarded as human beings . . . their dignity is insured and they receive fully humane 
treatment." Nicholas D. Kristof, China Report Sees Prison as One Big, Happy Jail, N.Y. TIMES, 
Aug. 12, 1992, at A7. 
6 Human rights organizations, as well as many Chinese, deny that the government 
supports human rights in the way it claims. Nicholas D. Kristof, China Issues Rebuttal to Human 
Rights Critics, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 3, 1991, at A12. One observer from the United States notes 
that "China's track record on human rights has been ghastly from the beginning." Mac-
Farquhar, supra note 2, at 42. 
7 Roberta Cohen, People'S Republic of China: Human Rights Exception, 9 HUM. RTS. Q. 447, 
459-68 (1987). Cohen lists reverence for Chinese culture, China's history as a subject of 
exploitation, and a suspicion of foreigners among the reasons why China has not been held 
accountable for human rights violations. Id. Other commentators have noted that deference 
to China on human rights issues is a result of political maneuvering; for example, the United 
States was "in the late 1970s moving toward formal recognition of the Chinese communist 
government-a movement inconvenienced by focusing on rights." DAVID P. FORSYTHE, Hu-
MAN RIGHTS AND WORLD POLITICS 112 (1989). Deference to China for political reasons 
continues today. See infra notes 172-189 and accompanying text. 
8 H.R. 2212, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. (1991). 
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mistreatment, and the right to life in the broadest sense."9 The 
international community has recognized these rights as fundamen-
tal to a human life of dignity. This Note also addresses policy issues, 
but only so far as those issues relate to the central legal question of 
how much human rights conditions of "The United States-China 
Act of 1991" reflected customary international law. 
Comparing and contrasting the respective human rights stan-
dards under customary international law and "The United States-
China Act of 1991" shows how the Act's conditions may bind China 
because they parallel customary international law. Part II defines 
the human rights obligations of nations under the United Nations 
Charter and customary international law, outlining those human 
rights protected under customary law and determining their nature 
and extent. This part also catalogues specific human rights viola-
tions committed by China. Part III examines the human rights 
standard employed by the United States when it acts extraterrito-
rially, focusing primarily on Congress' articulation of that standard 
in "The United States-China Act of 1991." Part IV compares the 
United States standard with its counterpart in customary interna-
tionallaw, noting discrepancies between the two and how the United 
States may find in customary international law additional authority 
for imposing human rights conditions upon China. Finally, Part V 
concludes that the United States may take easy steps to bring its 
standards into exact parallel with customary international law, 
thereby asserting greater authority when invoking its human rights 
standards against other countries. 
II. HUMAN RIGHTS AND CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW 
What are now referred to as "human rights" have been ex-
plicitly defined in an international context only since the Second 
World War.1O Human rights, however, have been a part of custom-
ary international law for centuries. I I Today, the idea of human 
9 Ann Kent, Waitingfor Rights: China's Human Rights and Chioo's Constitutions, 1949-1989, 
13 HUM. RTs. Q. 170, 171 (1991). 
10 Thomas Buergenthal, Interootioool Human Rights and Institutions: Accomplishments and 
Prospects. 63 WASH. L. REV. 1,2 (1988). 
II Louis B. Sohn, The New International Law: Protection of the Rights of Individuals Rather 
Than States, 32 AM. U. L. REV. I, 1-3 (1982). Originally, human rights concepts developed 
around a state's responsibility "for what happened within its territory and for its citizens' 
conduct on the high seas" and around the foreigner'S home state's entitlement to reparations 
for injury to its citizens. Id. at 2. In addition to the protection of diplomats, other historical 
precedents include movements to abolish slaver}' and the development of humanitarian law 
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rights encompasses layers of different rights 12 expressed through a 
number of international agreements and conventions, primarily 
through the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 13 and the 
United Nations Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. 14 
Thus, two routes may be followed toward holding the People's 
Republic of China to a human rights standard: one may invoke the 
United Nations Charter and the aforementioned international doc-
uments, or one may find a human rights standard in customary 
international law. Because neither the United States nor China is a 
party to the United Nations Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 
however, neither country is bound by that agreement. 15 Nor is the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights a binding document-it is 
a resolution that does not have the force of law. 16 Therefore, cus-
tomary international law seems the better path toward determining 
the scope of human rights obligations binding China. Before ex-
amining customary international law, however, it is worthwhile to 
note the United Nations Charter, and the human rights obligations 
it places upon its membership. 
A. Human Rights Obligations Under the United Nations Charter 
All nations that become members of the United Nations agree 
to the precepts of the United Nations CharterY Included among 
concerning armed conflict. B.G. RAMCHARAN, THE CONCEPT AND PRESENT STATUS OF THE 
INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS 13 (1989). 
12 See Buergenthal, supra note 10, at 6-13; Sohn, supra note 11, at 11. 
l:l Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217 A(III), U.N. Doc. A/81O, at 71 
(1948), reprinted in BASIC DOCUMENTS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW AND WORLD ORDER 298 (Burns 
H. Weston et al. eds., 1990) [hereinafter BASIC DOCUMENTS]. 
14 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, G.A. Res. 2200A(XXI), U.N. 
GAOR, 21st Sess., Supp. No. 16 at 52, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966), entered into force Mar. 23, 
1976, reprinted in BASIC DOCUMENTS at 376. 
15 While some of the protections against human rights violations contained in the Inter-
national Covenant on Civil and Political Rights are a part of customary international law, the 
document as a whole is not. By 1991, only 87 states, or approximately 54 percent of those 
eligible to sign, were parties to the covenant. David P. Forsythe, Human Rights in a Post-Cold 
War World, 15 FLETCHER FORUM OF WORLD AFFAIRS 55, 58 (1991). This represents only a 
simple majority, falling far short of universal consensus. 
16 See THOMAS BUERGENTHAL, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS IN A NUTSHELL 29 (1988). 
17 The United States of America has been represented in the United Nations since Oct. 
24, 1945. BASIC DOCUMENTS, supra note 13, at 894. The People's Republic of China has been 
represented in the United Nations since Oct. 26, 1971. Id. When China joined the United 
Nations, "it made no statements suggesting in any way that it should be made an exception 
to UN guidelines or documents on human rights." John F. Copper, Defining Human Rights in 
the People's Republic of China, in HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA 15 (Yuan-
Li Wu ed., 1988). 
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these precepts is Article 1(3), which states that promoting and en-
couraging human rights is one of the purposes of the United Na-
tions. Is In addition, Article 55 indicates that all states must respect 
and observe all human rights and fundamental freedoms.I9 Article 
56 pledges members "to take joint and separate action" toward 
achieving these objectives.20 
Although the U.N. Charter makes clear that member states 
have an obligation to promote basic human rights and fundamental 
freedoms, it leaves these terms undefined.21 They are not without 
importance, however, as they make clear that human rights are no 
longer entirely an issue of domestic jurisdiction. 22 The International 
Bill of Rights, especially the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights, gives substance to the vague Charter obligations, but does 
not compel legal action against every state which violates basic hu-
man rights. 
Few observers would deny that the United Nations Charter and 
the Universal Declaration embody the normative aspirations of the 
United Nations.23 The United States invokes the U.N. Charter and 
its human rights provisions in "The United States-China Act of 
1991."24 Because the provisions'status as international law is still 
questionable, this Note analyzes China's human rights violations and 
attempts by the United States to remedy the situation under cus-
tomary international law, that is, international law obligating China 
to respect certain fundamental human rights.25 
18 U.N. CHARTER art. I, ~ 3 (Among the purposes of the United Nations is "[t]o achieve 
international co-operation in solving international problems of an economic, social, cultural, 
or humanitarian character, and in promoting and encouraging respect for human rights and 
for fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion 
... "). 
19 [d. at art. 55 ("With a view to the creation of conditions of stability and well-being 
which are necessary for peaceful and friendly relations among nations based on respect for 
the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples, the United Nations shall 
promote ... (c) universal respect for, and observance of, human rights and fundamental 
freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion."). 
20 [d. at art. 56 ("All members pledge themselves to take joint and separate action in co-
operation with the Organization for the achievement of the purposes set forth in Article 
55."). 
21 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES 
§ 701 cmt. d (1987) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT]. 
22 BUERGENTHAL, supra note 16, at 22. 
23 [d. 
24 H.R. 2212, I02d Cong., 2d Sess. § 2(a)(2)(I99I). 
25 See infra note 28. 
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B. Customary International Law 
Customary international law exists outside of any treaty obli-
gation. The International Court of Justice defines it as the general 
practice of states which is accepted and observed as law.26 Customary 
international law has been characterized as the crystallization of past 
uniform practices into normative behavior.27 Norms become a part 
of customary international law "from a general and consistent prac-
tice of states which is followed by them from a sense of legal obli-
gation."28 Thus, the list of human rights protected by customary 
international law is not necessarily static; in the rapidly changing 
modern world, rights may be added to the list in a relatively short 
period of time as they become the common practice and belief of 
states.29 
As one commentator noted, locating customary international 
law can be an interminable task.30 Using international agreements 
26 Statute of the International Court of Justice, art. 38(1)(b). Done at San Francisco, June 
26, 1945. Entered into force, Oct. 24, 1945, reprinted in BASIC DOCUMENTS, supra note 13, at 
33. 
27 LUNG-CHU CHEN, AN INTRODUCTION TO CONTEMPORARY INTERNATIONAL LAW 361 
(1989). For' example, through the long and continued practice of nations regarding piracy 
on the seas as criminal activity, the act of piracy became recognized as a violation of customary 
international law. Similarly, certain human rights norms have become a part of customary 
law through wide acceptance and recitation. See FORSYTHE, supra note 7, at 12; see also 
BUERGENTHAL, supra note 16, at 32. 
If jurisdictional hurdles could be surmounted, and if the People's Republic of China 
could be brought before the International Court of Justice (ICJ) for human rights violations, 
the Statute of the ICJ allows the court to apply customary international law. Statute of the 
International Court of Justice, art. 38(l)(b), supra note 26. 
28 RESTATEMENT, supra note 21, § 102(2). The customary international law of human 
rights ranks higher than human rights treaties in terms of importance. See generally Theodor 
Meron, On a Hierarchy of International Human Rights, 80 AM. J. INT'L L. 1 (1986). This is 
because customary international law binds all nations, regardless of whether a state is a party 
to a particular human rights agreement. THEODOR MERON, HUMAN RIGHTS AND HUMANITAR-
IAN NORMS AS CUSTOMARY LAW 3 (1989) [hereinafter CUSTOMARY LAW). 
It is customary international law which binds states not parties to human rights treaties, 
and not identical treaty provisions. Id. Therefore, "customary international law continues to 
exist and apply, separately from international treaty law, even where these two categories of 
law have an identical content." Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua 
(Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986, I.C.]. 14 (June 27)(merits), quoted in CUSTOMARY LAW, supra, at 55. 
International agreements featuring provisions identical to customary international law may, 
however, be examined as articulations of customary international law. 
29 DAVID P. FORSYTHE, THE INTERNATIONALIZATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS 12 (1991). The 
time period for the adoption of a new norm into customary international law may be quite 
short. The International Court of Justice has said that "the passage of only a short period 
of time is not necessarily, or of itself, a bar to the formation of a new rule of customary 
international law." RESTATEMENT, supra note 21, § 102, reporters' note 2. 
30 Richard B. Bilder, The Status of International Human Rights Law: An Overoiew, in INTER-
NATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW AND PRACTICE 1,8 (James C. Tuttle ed., 1978). 
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that attempt to codify customary human rights norms, and cases in 
which international and domestic courts have applied customary 
international law in their decisions, it is possible to detail the specific 
human rights abuses that the international community acknowl-
edges as prohibited by customary international law. 
C. Human Rights Abuses Prohibited by Customary International Law 
Customary international law binds all nations.31 Although at-
tempts have been made over the past half-century· to definitively 
codify those human rights entitled to international recognition and 
protection, only certain rights have become a part of customary 
international law through repeated use and recitation. These rights 
are the minimum standard of human rights, reflecting protection 
of a person's physical integrity, as well as basic civil rights.32 
The minimum standard of human rights includes freedom 
from violent attacks, slavery and related practices, torture, summary 
execution, mistreatment, starvation, hostage taking, racism, and war 
crimes.33 The Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of 
the United States34 holds that a country is in violation of customary 
international law if it practices, encourages or condones: 
(a) genocide, 
(b) slavery or slave trade, 
(c) the murder or causing the disappearance of individuals, 
(d) the torture or other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment 
or punishment, 
(e) prolonged arbitrary detention, 
(f) systematic racial discrimination, or 
(g) a consistent pattern of gross violations of internationally 
recognized human rights.35 
" A rule of customary international law, however, is "not binding on any state indicating 
dissent during development of the rule." RESTATEMENT, supra note 21, § 102, reporters' note 
12. Actual exemption from a rule of customary international law in practice has been rare. 
Id. The People's Republic of China does not fall into this category; in fact, China claims to 
actively support basic human rights. See supra note 5. 
'2 See McCredie, supra note 1, at 225. 
" FORSYTHE, supra note 29, at 12. 
M The RESTATEMENT sets forth "rules or principles of international law that apply to 
states generally .... [T]he word 'states' [refers] to the nation-states that constitute the 
international political community." RESTATEMENT, supra note 21, introductory note at 5. 
35 RESTATEMENT, supra note 21, § 702(aHg). In choosing this "laundry list" of human 
rights abuses violative of customary international law, the Restatement reporters "wisely have 
selected only those rights ... 'whose status as customary law is generally accepted at this time 
and whose scope and content are generally agreed.'" Richard B. Lillich, The Customary 
International Law of Human Rights in the Revised Restatement, 89 AM. SOC'y INT'L L. PROC. 84, 
85 (1985). 
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The list emphasizes protection of an individual's physical integrity, 
the preeminent protection provided by customary international law. 
The abuse of rights in (a) through (f) are violations of customary 
international law even if such abuse is not consistent with, or a part 
of, a pattern.36 These rights are jus cogens; that is, they are so 
fundamental that they may not be abridged, even by positive law.37 
The Restatement's listing of rights protected under customary in-
ternational law is conservative; several commentators have sug-
gested it include other human rights as well.38 
56 RESTATEMENT, supra note 21, § 702 cmt. m. 
57 Jus cogens are peremptory norms. RESTATEMENT, supra note 21, § 702 cmt. n. Pereinp-
tory norms are principles of general international law so compelling that they are "recognized 
by the international community for the purpose of invalidating or forcing revision in ordinary 
norms of treaty or custom in conflict with them. For example ... States [sic] ought not be 
able to agree to enslave a minority people, to liquidate a race, [or] to brutalize dissidents 
.... " Gordon A. Christenson, Jus Cogens: Guarding Interests Fundamental to International 
Society, 28 VA. J. INT'L L. 585, 586 (1988). 
58 Some commentators believe that all of the rights enumerated in the Universal Decla-
ration have become a part of customary international law. See Bilder, supra note 30, at 8; 
Sohn, supra note 11, at 16-17. Other commentators stake out a middle ground between this 
view and the RESTATEMENT. Professor Meron takes this middle position. CUSTOMARY LAw, 
supra note 28, at 96-97. 
Among those additional rights Meron says are protected by customary international law 
are the right of self-determination and the prohibition of retroactive penal measures. Id. at 
96. Some of the other due process guarantees from Article 14 of the International Covenant 
on Civil and Political Rights may also have claims to protection under customary international 
law. Id. Article 14 provides that: 
(2) Everyone charged with a criminal offence shall have the right to be presumed 
innocent until proved guilty according to law. . 
(3) In the determination of any criminal charge against him, everyone shall be 
entitled to the following minimum guarantees, in full equality: 
(e) to examine, or have examined, the witnesses against him and to obtain the 
attendance and examination of witnesses on his behalf under the same conditions 
as witnesses against him; 
(g) not to be compelled to testify against himself or to confess guilt. 
(5) Everyone convicted of a crime shall have the right to his conviction and sentence 
being reviewed by a higher tribunal according to law. 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 14, at part III, art. 14. 
Other commentators would go even further in listing rights protected under customary 
international law. For example, Professor Lillich would include the right to equality before 
the law and the right to non-discrimination, as well as the right of the individual to move 
freely between his or her own state and other states. Richard B. Lillich, Civil Rights, in 1 
HUMAN RIGHTS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 115, 133, 151 (Theodor MeTOn ed., 1984). For the 
purposes of this Note, however, the list of protected human rights in customary international 
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In addition to the enumerated prohibitions (a) through (f), the 
minimum standard includes rights which, if continually abridged, 
would constitute a violation of customary international law. These 
gross violations are defined as those that are "particularly shocking 
because of the importance of the right or the gravity of the viola-
tion."39 No state government would admit to violating these rights 
as a matter of national policy.40 
These gross violations of human rights must occur often 
enough to be considered a part of a "consistent pattern." To follow 
a "consistent pattern" means that these violations, though gross, do 
not offend customary international law if committed singly or even 
sporadically over time.41 Examples include systematic harassment, 
invasions of privacy of the home, arbitrary arrest and detention, 
denial of fair trial in criminal cases, grossly disproportionate pun-
ishment, denial of freedom of conscience and religion, and denial 
of the basic right to marry and to raise a family.42 This category of 
rights is purposefully flexible so as to allow additional rights to be 
added in the future. 
D. China's Violations of Customary International Law 
The People's Republic of China has violated customary inter-
national law by denying its citizens basic human rights. China has 
caused the disappearance of individuals,43 and tortured44 and ar-
bitrarily detained persons for prolonged periods of time.45 In ad-
dition, China is responsible for many consistent, gross violations of 
human rights, including arbitrary arrest and detention, denial of 
fair trial in criminal cases, denial of freedom of conscience and 
thought, denial of freedom of religion, and denial of the right to 
marry and to raise a family.46 Finally, China is also responsible for 
many basic human rights abuses in Tibet. 
law will be that of the most conservative listing, provided in the RESTATEMENT. See also supra 
note 35 and accompanying text. 
39 RESTATEMENT, supra note 21, § 702 cmt. m. 
40 [d. § 702, reporters' note 10. 
41 [d. § 702, cmt. m. 
42 [d. 
43 [d. § 702(c). 
44 [d. § 702(d). 
45 !d. § 702(e). 
46 See id. § 702 cmt. m. 
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1. Murder and Causing the Disappearance of Individuals 
Murder and causing the disappearance of individuals has long 
been recognized as a violation of international law.47 A state may 
not kill an individual, or cause an individual to disappear, other 
than as lawful punishment after conviction.48 A single instance of 
murder or disappearance violates customary internationallaw.49 
The case of Zhang Zhenggao offers an example of China's 
causing the disappearance of an individua1.50 While in the United 
States, Zhang, a former official from the Ministry of Petroleum 
Industry, went to a New York hospital for treatment related to a 
fall. 51 He entered the hospital on April 19, 1984. Zhang applied for 
political asylum, but mysteriously disappeared on July 19, 1984.52 
Following his disappearance, the Chinese Consul General an-
nounced that Zhang "had decided to return to China 'voluntarily."'53 
Many believe Chinese agents in the U.S. abducted Zhang. 54 
2. Torture or Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment 
Th~ People's Republic of China also violates customary inter-
national law by engaging in torture and other cruel, inhuman and 
degrading treatment of persons.55 Such behavior is defined as acts 
inflicting severe mental or physical pain and suffering upon an 
individual, by or with the permission of a public official.56 State 
47/d. § 702 cmt. f; see also International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra 
note 14, at part III, art. 6(1) ("Every human being has the inherent right to life. This right 
shall be protected by law. No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his life."); Universal 
Declaration, supra note 13, art. 3 ("Everyone has the right to life ... and security of the 
person."). 
48 RESTATEMENT, supra note 21, § 702 cmt. f. 
49 See supra notes 36-37 and accompanying text. 
50 Hungdah Chiu, Recent Legal Issues Between the U.S. and the People's Republic o/China, 12 
MD. J. INT'L L. & TRADE 1,8 (1987). 
"Id. 
521d. 
551d. 
MId. 
55 RESTATEMENT, supra note 21, § 702(d); see also International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights, supra note 14, at part III, art. 7 ("No one shall be subjected to torture or to 
cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment."); Universal Declaration, supra note 
13, at art. 5 (identical language); FiIartiga v. Pena-IraIa, 630 F.2d 876, 884 (2d Cir. 1980) 
(after examining the sources from which customary international law is derived-the practice 
of nations, judicial opinions, and the work of scholars--the court concluded that "official 
torture is now prohibited by the law of nations."). 
56 Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment, art. 1(1), G.A. Res. 3452, Dec. 10, 1948, 39 U.N. GAOR, Sess. 39, Supp. No. 
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action falls under this definition if it is inflicted to obtain informa-
tion, to punish for an act committed or suspected of having been 
committed, or to intimidate. 57 Like murder and causing disappear-
ance, a single instance of torture or cruel and degrading treatment 
violates customary international law. 58 
Journalists and international human rights organizations have 
reported numerous instances of torture or other cruel and degrad-
ing treatment. 59 Amnesty International notes that the methods of 
torture most commonly applied in China include "severe beatings, 
shocks with electric batons and the use of handcuffs, shackles or 
ropes in positions deliberately intended to inflict pain."60 Informa-
tion on practices of torture and other cruel and inhuman treatment 
has also been provided by both private Chinese citizens and gov-
ernment officials.61 For example, according to an account by Wei 
Jingsheng, a dissident arrested in 1979: 
inmates reported "frequent beatings and torture by electric 
shocks, strong lights and drugs." Prisoners received near star-
vation rations of food and were permitted "one change of 
clothes a year, a monthly shower and ... work or exercise only 
if they [were] deemed to have a good attitude."62 
Incidence of torture and cruel and unusual punishment is most 
likely higher than reported because few persons risk complaining, 
for fear of retribution.63 
3. Prolonged Arbitrary Detention 
China is also responsible for subjecting persons to prolonged 
arbitrary detention.64 Detention is considered arbitrary if it is not 
51, at 197, U.N. Doc. ElCn.4I1984172 (1984), entered into force June 26, 1987, reprinted in 
BASIC DOCUMENTS, supra note 13, at 463. 
57Id. 
58 See supra notes 36-37 and accompanying text. 
59 See Cohen, supra note 7, at 493-502. 
60 AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, PEoPLE'S REpUBLIC OF CHINA: VIOLATIONS OF HUMAN RIGHTS 
13 (1991) [hereinafter AMNESTY REpORT]. Non-governmental organizations such as Amnesty 
International playa vital role "in the collection and dissemination of facts concerning alleged 
violations of human rights." Theo van Boven, The Role of Non-Governmental Organizations in 
International Human Riglits Standard-Setting: A Prerequisite of Democracy, 20 CAL. W. INT'L L.J. 
207, 207 (1990). Many organizations, including the United Nations, rely on information 
provided by these groups. Id. 
61 See Cohen, supra note 7, at 494-95. 
62Id. at 494. 
65 AMNESTY REpORT, supra note 60, at 13. 
64 RESTATEMENT, supra note 21, § 702(e); see also Forti v. Suarez-Mason, 672 F. Supp. 
1531, 1541 (N.D. Cal. 1987) (the court held that the clear consensus among nations is that 
prolonged arbitrary detention is a violation of customary international law). 
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pursuant to law, or if it is "incompatible with the principles of justice 
or with the dignity of the human person."65 Detention may be 
arbitrary for a number of reasons: 
if it is supported only by a general warrant, or is not accom-
panied by notice of charges; if the person detained is not given 
early opportunity to communicate with family or to consult 
counsel; or is not brought to trial within a reasonable time.66 
Prolonged arbitrary detention is distinguished from arbitrary de-
tention by the amount of time the individual is detained without 
being charged. A single episode of prolonged arbitrary detention, 
without charge, violates customary internationallaw.67 
The recent case of Bao Tong provides an example of prolonged 
arbitrary detention. Jailed in connection with the 1989 Tiananmen 
uprising, Bao was political secretary to the Standing Committee of 
the Politburo before being taken into state custody.68 The govern-
ment incarcerated him in Quincheng Prison for more than two 
years before he was formally arrested and his family notified.69 Bao's 
case is typical: Amnesty International notes that it is common for 
the Chinese government to detain persons for long periods of time 
without charge.7o 
4. Other Consistent Gross Violations of Human Rights 
Beyond those abuses already mentioned, the People's Republic 
of China has followed a pattern of continually violating other hu-
man rights of its citizens. Among these abuses are consistent arbi-
trary arrests and detentions.71 In January 1987, for example, Yang 
Wei, a Chinese student returning from the United States, was 
65 RESTATEMENT, supra note 21, § 702 cmt. h. 
66 Id. 
67 See supra notes 36-37 and accompanying text. 
68 Sheryl WuDunn, Trial Nears for Ex-China Aide, Held 2 112 Years, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 9, 
1992, at A6. 
69Id. 
70 See AMNESTY REpORT, supra note 60, at 1. 
71 Arbitrary arrest and detention, even if not prolonged, violate customary international 
law if committed consistently by a state. RESTATEMENT, supra note 21, § 702 cmt. m; see also 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 14, at part III, art. 9(1) ("No 
one shall be subjected to arbitrary arrest or detention."); Universal Declaration, supra note 
13, at art. 9 (identical language). 
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arrested for unspecified charges and later sentenced to two years 
imprisonment.72 Hundreds of similar arrests took place in connec-
tion with the 1989 Tiananmen uprising.73 The government's prac-
tice of administrative detention permits the police to detain people 
merely upon the suspicion that they may have committed a crime.74 
China has also continually denied fair trials in criminal cases.75 
Fair trials for criminal defendants in China are rare; since 1989, 
the government executed, after summary trials, over a thousand 
people convicted of ordinary offenses.76 Authorities often render 
verdicts and sentences before a trial-type hearing takes place.77 
For those accused of political crimes, the outcome is usually 
equally bleak. The majority of political trials are closed to the public 
with, at best, only the defendants' close relatives or members of 
their "work unit" allowed to attend.78 During the period of pre-trial 
detention, detainees have no access to a lawyer or their families. 79 
Some Chinese believe that Bao Tong, like others detained for their 
political activities, would be tried in secret. 80 
The government has also continually denied freedom of con-
science and thought to the Chinese people.8l The Beijing govern-
ment is known to have imprisoned many Chinese for their peaceful 
72 Chiu, supra note 50, at lO. 
73 AMNESTY REPORT, supra note 60, at 3-4; CHERRINGTON, supra note I, at 2lO; Emily 
MacFarquhar, Back to the Future in China, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REpORT, Mar. 12, 1990, at 42; 
Sheryl WuDunn, China Reports Freeing 9 Democracy Campaigners, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 28, 1992, 
at A9. 
74 AMNESTY REPORT, supra note 60, at 2. 
75 Consistent denial by the state of fair trials in criminal cases violates customary inter-
national law. RESTATEMENT, supra note 21, § 702 cmt. m; see also International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights, supra note 14, at part Ill, art. 14(1) ("In the determination of any 
criminal charges against him ... everyone shall be entitled to a fair and public hearing by a 
competent, independent and impartial tribunal established by law."); Universal Declaration, 
supra note 13, at art. lO ("Everyone is entitled in full equality to a fair and public hearing by 
an independent and impartial tribunal, in the determination of his rights and obligations 
and of any criminal charges against him."). 
76 AMNESTY REpORT, supra note 60, at 6, lO-11. 
771d. Chinese jurists and citizens openly refer to the system as xian pan hou shen ("verdict 
first, trial second"). /d.; see also Drinan & Kuo, supra note 3, at 25. 
78 AMNESTY REPORT, supra note 60, at 7. 
791d. 
80 See supra notes 68-69 and accompanying text. 
81 Continued denial by the state of freedom of conscience, thought and religion violates 
customary international law. RESTATEMENT, supra note 21, § 702 cmt. m; see also International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 14, part III, art. 18(1) ("Everyone shall 
have the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion."); Universal Declaration, supra 
note 13, at art. 18 ("Everyone has the freedom of thought, conscience and religion .... "). 
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expression of dissenting opinions.82 Among those jailed have been 
editors, Roman Catholic priests, and people who publicly protested 
poverty, unemployment, or miscarriages of justice.83 
Similarly, the Chinese people have continually been denied 
freedom of religion.84 Religion is considered a possible competitor 
with the state for the people's loyalty.85 In 1990, for example, "there 
was growing evidence of a tightening in the official policy on reli-
gion."86 Between 1989 and late 1990, over 100 Roman Catholic 
priests, bishops and lay leaders were reported to officials; as of 
April 1991, the government still held several dozen.87 
Finally, the Chinese government has consistently abridged the 
right to marry and to raise a family.88 The government supports a 
one-child family planning program.89 Reports claim that doctors 
smash infants' skulls at birth, and that women are bound, thrown 
into hog cages and delivered by the truckload to abortion clinics.90 
In addition, intrauterine contraceptive devices are frequently im-
planted immediately after a woman gives birth to her first child, 
often without her consent or knowledge.9l 
82 See AMNESTY REPORT, supra note 60, at 4. 
83 Harry Anderson with Donna Foote, China; "A Wave of Mass Executions," NEWSWEEK, 
Oct. 8, 1984, at 38. 
84 See supra note 81. 
85 W. Gary Vause, Tibet to Tiananmen: Chinese Human Rights and United States Foreign Policy, 
42 VAND. L. REv. 1575, 1598 (1989). The number of Chinese practicing religion has increased 
dramatically in the past two decades. [d. at 1600. Reports estimate that in 1987, China was 
home to three million Catholics, four million Protestants, fifteen million Muslims, and more 
than ten million Buddhists. Id. Ironically, outlawing popular religion caused it to move 
underground, where it often flourishes. THOMAS HEBERER, CHINA AND ITs NATIONAL MI-
NORITIES: AUTONOMY OR ASSIMILATION? 113 (1989). 
86 AMNESTY REPORT, supra note 60, at 4. 
87 Id. 
88 Consistent denial by the state of the right to marry and to raise a family violates 
customary international law. RESTATEMENT, supra note 21 § 702 cmt. m; see also International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 14, part III, art. 23(2) ("The right of men 
and women of marriageable age to marry and to found a family shall be recognized."); 
Universal Declaration, supra note 13, art. 16(1) ("Men and women of full age, without any 
limitation due to race, nationality or religion, have the right to marry and to found a family."), 
art. 25(2) ("Motherhood and childhood are entitled to special care and assistance."). 
89 Chiu, supra note 50, at 8. 
90 Anne Joyce, Note, China: United States Withdrawal of Support from the United Nations 
Fund for Population Activities, 1 HARV. HUM. RTS. YRBK. 205, 205 (1988). 
91 Id. See also Nicholas D. Kristof, Stark Data On Women: 100 MiUion Are Missing, N.Y. 
TIMES, Nov. 5, 1991, at Cl. The author notes another effect of China's one-child policy: the 
killing of newborn girls. Each year, "about 600,000 fewer girl births are reported to the 
authorities than there should be, based on the number of boy births and the ratio that should 
exist between them." [d. 
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5. Human Rights Violations in Tibet 
China has committed a long series of human rights abuses in 
Tibet. Chinese troops have occupied Tibet since 1950,92 when Tibet 
decided to negotiate with its powerful neighbor. Armed resistance 
began in 1954, and in 1959, Chinese forces suppressed a rebellion.93 
China established the "Tibet Autonomous Region" in 1965.94 
In 1983, Chinese forces arrested hundreds of Tibetan protes-
tors for handing out petitions on independence to foreign journal-
ists; several protestors were reportedly executed.95 In addition, the 
government allegedly arrested more than a hundred Tibetans in 
1986 for supposed ties to Tibetan groups abroad.96 As of 1991, 
about 200 political prisoners were believed to be held in the Tibetan 
capital of Lhasa.97 The Dalai Lama, Tibet's religious leader, has 
repeatedly asked for withdrawal of Chinese troops.98 
The human rights abuses committed by China against its own 
people and the citizens of Tibet involve fundamental rights, such 
as a person's right to be free of physical violation, whether that 
threat involves detention, torture, or worse. In addition, there is 
overwhelming evidence of China's continual disregard for many 
civil and political rights. In light of these basic human rights viola-
tions, the United States Congress attached human rights conditions 
to the continuance of MFN status for the People's Republic of 
China. 
III. THE AMERICAN ARTICULATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS 
The United States has frequently articulated its human rights 
standards in domestic legislation. The United States articulation 
may be traced back to the Revolutionary period and the Declaration 
of Independence;99 various state constitutions also contain within 
92 Chiu, supra note 50, at 11. For a brief history of Tibet, see HEBERER, supra note 85, at 
118-20. 
95 Chiu, supra note 50, at 11. 
94 Vause, supra note 85, at 1578. 
95 Cohen, supra note 7, at 497. 
96 [d. 
97 AMNESTY REpORT, supra note 60, at 4. 
98 In 1987, for example, the Dalai Lama appeared before the Congressional Human 
Rights Caucus, presenting a five-point plan to transform Tibet into a "zone of peace and 
non-violence." Vause, supra note 85, at 1588. 
99 See Louis Henkin, Rights: American and Human, 79 COLUM. L. REv. 405, 405 (1979). 
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them the embodiment of Revolutionary human rights theory.100 
The Founders codified their ideals in the Bill of Rights, the first 
ten amendments to the United States Constitution. lol Many of those 
rights have been incorporated into the standard of human rights 
articulated by the United States. 
A. The Modern Articulation 
In order to give meaning to "The United States-China Act of 
1991," it is appropriate to look at how the United States has artic-
ulated human rights in the past, because the modern stance has its 
origins in United States history. Only since World War II and P~es­
ident Franklin D. Roosevelt's pronouncement of the Four Freedoms 
has the United States signalled its desire to encourage human rights 
outside of its own borders. 102 The Four Freedoms were freedom of 
speech and expression, freedom of every person to worship God, 
freedom from want and freedom from fear.lo3 
Although the United States made few human rights pro-
nouncements before the 1970s, Congress has since moved to create 
a humari rights standard reflecting United States philosophy and 
tradition, which is applicable to dealings with foreign nations. 104 
Because the United States has become a party to few human rights 
agreements, its human rights actions have been almost entirely 
100 Henkin, supra note 99, at 406; Richard B. Lillich, The Constitution and International 
Human Rights, 83 AM. J. INT'L L. 851, 851 (1989). 
101 Henkin, supra note 99, at 407. The Bill of Rights details the rights the Framers 
considered fundamental to a human life of dignity. !d. at 411. The Bill of Rights restricts 
government interference with the Framers' idea of the natural and inalienable rights of man. 
See M. Glen Johnson, Historical Perspectives on Human Rights and U.S. Foreign Policy, 2 UNIV. 
HUM. RTs. 1,6 (1980). 
102 But see David Weissbrodt, Human Rights Legislation and U.S. Foreign Policy, 7 GA. J. 
INT'L & COMPo L. 231, 232 (1977). The historical basis for U.S. concerns about human rights 
derives from the late 19th and early 20th centuries, "when the United States regularly spoke 
out in favor of at least two basic rights closely associated with the American national expe-
rience-the right of self government and the right to freedom of religion." Id. 
10. See Buergenthal, supra note 10, at 2-3. History would prove President Roosevelt 
almost utopian in his aspirations. Eleanor Roosevelt more accurately stated the perspective 
adopted by the United States. She explained that: 
[B]asic human rights are simple and easily understood; freedom of speech and a 
free press; freedom of religion and worship; freedom of assembly and the right of 
petition; the right of men to be secure in their homes and free from unreasonable 
search and seizure and from arbitrary arrest and punishment. 
Johnson, supra note 101, at 8. This articulation reflects the civil and political liberties inherent 
in the Declaration of Independence, and protected by the Bill of Rights. 
104 See Thomas Buergenthal, The U.S. and International Human Rights, 9 HUM. RTs. L. J. 
141, 152-57 (1988). 
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uniiateral. 105 The international authority of a United States stan-
dard, therefore, rests on how much it complies with what is already 
expected of nations under customary international law. Because 
"The United States-China Act of 1991" is a product of Congress, it 
is helpful to review the extent of Congressional power in foreign 
affairs, and some of the legislation to which the Act owes its exis-
tence. 
B. Congressional Foreign Policy Legislation 
1. Constitutional Authority 
Which branch of the United States government should guide 
foreign affairs has long been debated. It has been said that "[f1or 
national purposes, we are but one people, one nation, one power."106 
The debate has a long history. Alexander Hamilton espoused pres-
idential supremacy in foreign relations, believing that any foreign 
affairs power not specifically granted Congress by the Constitution 
was reserved to the executive. 107 James Madison, on the other hand, 
thought that Congress should speak with the strongest voice in 
foreign affairs. lOB He believed that the constitutional powers in this 
area restricted the president, rather than limiting Congress. 109 
Congress has in recent years found its way into foreign affairs, 
most often when it is displeased with a president's handling of 
foreign policy. Congress' power to exert control over foreign affairs 
derives from several articles of the Constitution. Congress has the 
power to provide for the common defense and to regulate foreign 
commerce. 110 In addition, Congress also has the power to declare 
war, to make rules of war, to grant letters of marque and reprisal, III 
and to raise and support the United States armed forces. ll2 The 
105 DAVID P. FORSYTHE, HUMAN RIGHTS AND u.s. FOREIGN POLICY: CONGRESS RECONSI-
DERED 2 (1988). 
106 Zschernig v. Miller, 389 u.s. 429, 442 (1968) (Stewart, J. concurring)(quoting The 
Chinese Exclusion Case, 130 U.S. 581, 606 (1889». 
107 Vause, supra note 85, at 1607-08. 
IOSld. at 1609. 
1091d. Madison also supported the inclusion of human rights in foreign policy consid-
erations. See Johnson, supra note 101, at 3. 
llO U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cis. 1,3 ("The Congress shall have Power to ... provide for 
the common Defence ... To regulate Commerce with foreign Nations ... "). 
lliid. art. I, § 8, cI. 11 (Congress has the power "[t]o declare War, grant Letters of 
Marque and Reprisal, and make Rules concerning Captures on Land and Water ... "). 
ll2ld. art. I, § 8,ds. 12, 13 (Congress has the power "[t]o raise and support Armies, ... 
[t]o provide and maintain a Navy ... "). 
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Senate alone has specific foreign affairs power, to advise the presi-
dent on treaties and to approve treaties by a two-thirds vote before 
ratification. I 13 
Other articles of the Constitution grant Congress some power 
to deal with foreign affairs. Congress holds the spending power, a 
significant tool for making its will known to the executive branch. 114 
Exercise of congressional power under the spending authority 
means that "Congress virtually can veto programs essential to the 
presidential foreign affairs agenda."115 The "necessary and proper" 
clause has also been a source of congressional power in this area. 116 
Thus, it seems settled that Congress does have some authority in 
foreign affairs; use of that power in the area of international human 
rights is best demonstrated by previous congressional actions. 
2. Early Congressional Legislation 
The constitutional debate aside, the executive branch, primarily 
responsible for foreign policy, has led the way in human rights. ll7 
113 Id. art. II, § 2, d. 2 (The President "shall have Power, by and with the Advice and 
Consent of the Senate, to make Treaties, provided two thirds of the Senators present concur 
.... "). 
1I4Id. art. I, § 8, d. I (Congress has the power "[tlo lay and collect Taxes, Duties, Imposts 
and Excises ... "). 
115 Vause, supra note 85, at 1609. 
116 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, d. 18 (Congress has the power "[tlo make all laws which shall 
be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution the foregoing Powers, and all Powers 
vested by this Constitution in the Government of the United States, or in any Department 
or Officer thereof."). For the most part, the United States Supreme Court has not addressed 
the fragile balance of power between the executive and legislative branches in the area of 
foreign affairs. In Baker v. Carr, Justice Brennan, writing for the m~ority, noted that the 
foreign relations power "is committed by the Constitution to the executive and legislative-
'the political-Departments of the Government, and the propriety of what may be done in 
the exercise of this political power is not subject to judicial inquiry or decision.'" 369 U.S. 
186,211 n.31 (1962) (quoting Oetjen v. Central Leather Co., 246 U.S. 297, 302 (1918)). 
117 Foreign policy traditionally has been seen as a function of the executive branch, a 
view which derives from unquestioned practice dating back to the earliest days of the United 
States. See Michael J. Glennon, War and the Constitution, FOREIGN AFFAIRS, Spring, 1991, at 
89; LOUIS HENKIN, CONSTITUTIONALISM, DEMOCRACY, AND FOREIGN AFFAIRS 29 (1990). The 
Department of State, an office of the executive branch, houses the Congressionally mandated 
Bureau of Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs. Patricia M. Derian, Human Rights in 
United States Foreign Policy--An Executive Perspective, in INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS IN LAW 
AND PRACTICE 183, 184 (James C. Tuttle ed., 1978). 
When Jimmy Carter was elected to the White House in 1976, he became the first 
President to announce human rights as a substantive component of United States foreign 
policy. ROBERT A. DIVINE, SINCE 1945: POLITICS AND DIPLOMACY IN RECENT AMERICAN HIS-
TORY 220 (3d cd. 1985); Weissbrodt, supra note 102, at 232. Carter emphasized the protection 
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In 1973, however, Congress held hearings on the subject of human 
rights in response to perceived inaction by the executive branch. 118 
The House Subcommittee on International Organizations and 
Movements of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs produced 
a report, "Human Rights and the World Community: A Call for 
U.S. Leadership,"1l9 which made several recommendations prompt-
ing new human rights legislation. 120 Those suggestions primarily 
called for integration of human rights into the formulation and 
execution of United States foreign policy.l2l The human rights 
conditions to China's MFN status in "The United States-China Act 
of 1991" are directly related to Congress' 1970s activities. 
The first result of Congress' new interest in human rights was 
the Foreign Assistance Act of 1973.122 The Act expressed the gen-
eral human rights concerns of protecting physical integrity of the 
person and protecting political liberties. The Act declared that eco-
nomic and military assistance should be denied any foreign country 
"which practices the internment or imprisonment of that country's 
citizens for political purposes."123 
In 1974, Congress added a new section to the Foreign Assis-
tance Act of 1961.i24 The purpos~ of this addition was to reduce or 
terminate security assistance to any country engaged in "gross vio-
lations of international human rightS."125 The Act defined gross 
violations of human rights as torture, cruel, inhuman, or degrading 
treatment or punishment, prolonged detention without charges, or 
of physical integrity; in addition, he included specific civil and political rights, such as freedom 
of thought, of religion, of assembly, of speech, of the press, of movement within one's own 
country and freedom to take part in government. Johnson, supra note 101, at 9-10. 
The Reagan administration emphasized traditional concerns related to the physical 
integrity of the individual and human dignity. Richard Schifter, Building Firm Foundations: 
The Institutionalization of United States Human Rights Policy in the Reagan Years, 2 HARV. HUM. 
RTS. YRBK. 3, 13 (1989). The primary concern of the Reagan administration, however, may 
not have been human rights at all, but justification for supporting so-called "friendly" counter-
insurgency groups such as the Contras in Nicaragua. See A. GLENN MOWER, JR., HUMAN 
RIGHTS AND AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY: THE CARTER AND REAGAN EXPERIENCE 48-49, 115 
(1987); Jerome J. Shestack, An Unsteady Focus: The Vulnerabilities of the Reagan Administration's 
Human Rights Policy, 2 HARV. HUM. RTS. YRBK. 25,28 (1989). 
118 Weissbrodt, supra note 102, at 239. 
119Id. 
120 Id. at 240. 
121 BUERGENTHAL, supra note 16, at 231. 
122 Weissbrodt, supra note 102, at 241. 
1251d. 
1241d. 
1251d. at 242 nAI. 
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"other flagrant denials of life, liberty, and security of the person."126 
Derogation from this standard was acceptable in cases of extraor-
dinary circumstances, which were not defined but left to the discre-
tion of the executive. 127 
This basic human rights statement became the building block 
for the United States articulation of human rightS. 128 Congress pur-
posefully mirrored language contained in many United Nations 
human rights documents. 129 Congressional use· of similar language 
indicates "its desire to ensure that these laws would not constitute 
illegal intervention in the domestic affairs of other countries."130 
The phrasing remains virtually intact in "The United States-China 
Act of 1991." . 
B. "The United States-China Act of 1991" 
The final draft of "The United States-China Act of 1991" was 
passed through the Senate on February 25, 1992.131 Legislators 
designed the bill to extend MFN treatment to the People's Republic 
of China, provided that Beijing meets certain human rights condi-
tions. Congress formulated these requirements around human 
rights violations committed by the government of China, while fol-
lowing the human rights articulations of previous legislation. 132 The 
126 [d. 
127 [d. at 242. 
128 For a discussion of general legislation containing hu~an rights provisions, see Weiss-
brodt, supra note 102, at 240-50. In addition to general legislation, Congress also has 
employed this basic articulation of human rights in state-specific legislation directed toward 
such countries as Chile, El Salvador, Argentina and Haiti. Buergenthal, supra note 104, at 
156-67; FORSYTHE, supra note 105, at 14-15. 
129 BUERGENTHAL, supra note 16, at 234. 
130 [d. 
'" See supra note 3 and accompanying text. Like the Foreign Assistance Act, congressional 
ability to affect China policy derives from the constitutional commerce power. See supra note 
110 and accompanying text. 
132 Not all of the conditions of "The United States-China Act of 1991" related to human 
rights. Conditions included "Trade Objectives," calling for economic protection of United 
States intellectual property, fair access to Chinese markets, and an end to unfair trade 
practices. H.R. 2212, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. § 3(c)(l)-(3)(1991). In addition, the Act called for 
an end to weapons proliferation, including taking steps to assure that China "is not assisting 
and will not assist any non-nuclear weapons state, directly or indirectly, in acquiring nuclear 
explosive devices or the materials and components for such devices." [d. § 3(d)(l)--(2). The 
Act also called for China to adhere to the Joint Declaration on Hong Kong between the 
United Kingdom and the People's Republic of China. [d. § 3(b)(l0). Hong Kong is to be 
transferred from British to Chinese sovereignty on July I, 1997. JAN MORRIS, HONG KONG 
23 (1989). 
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Act resulted in part from displeasure at President Bush's handling 
of China since the events of Tiananmen Square. 133 
1. Findings and Conditions 
In "The United States-China Act of 1991," Congress made 
findings which parallel many of the human rights abuses reported 
by Amnesty International and other international human rights 
organizations. Among Congress' findings was that the government 
of the People's Republic of China "continues to engage in flagrant 
violations of internationally recognized human rights."134 In addi-
tion, China is continually violating internationally recognized hu-
man rights of Tibetans, and uses "the People's Liberation Army 
and police forces to intimidate and repress Tibetan and Chinese 
citizens peacefully demonstrating for democratic change and reli-
gious freedom."135 
Congress invoked the Trade Act of 1974 in "The United States-
China Act of 1991" to require President Bush to deny MFN status 
to China unless certain conditions are met. 136 The conditions relat-
ing to human rights include China's accounting for citizens de-
tained, accused, or sentenced as a result of nonviolent expression 
of their political beliefs, and the release of those people imprisoned 
for such reasons. 137 In addition, the Act requires China to take 
appropriate action to prevent gross violations of internationally 
recognized human rights,138 and to end exports of products to the 
United States made by convict, forced, or indentured labor.139 
133 H.R. 2212. § 2(a)(I). 
134Id. § 2(a)(2). 
135Id. § 2(a)(5). 
136Id. § 3(a). The president may waive conditions to MFN treatment. Any such recom-
mendation shall: 
(A) be made not later than 30 days before the expiration of such authority; 
(B) be made in a document transmitted to the House of Representatives and the 
Senate setting forth his reasons for recommending the extension of such authority; 
and 
(C) include, for each country with respect to which a waiver granted under subsection 
(c) of this section is in effect, a determination that continuation of the waiver 
applicable to that country will substantially promote the objectives of this section, 
and a statement setting forth his reasons for such a determination. 
19 U.S.C. § 2432(d)(l)(1975 & Supp. 1992). 
137 H.R. 2212, § 3(a)(I)(A). 
138/d. § 3(b)(1). 
139Id. § 3(b)(2). 
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Furthermore, the Chinese government is required to terminate 
religious persecution in both China and Tibet,140 and to remove 
restrictions on freedom of the press and Voice of America broad-
casts.141 The government must ensure access of human rights or-
ganizations to both China and Tibet and ensure freedom from 
torture and inhumane prison conditions. 142 Finally, the Act called 
for an end to prohibitions on peaceful assembly and demonstra-
tion,143 and a commitment from Beijing to engage in "high-level 
discussions on human rights issues."144 
2. Definitions 
In its separate "Definitions" section, the Act outlines the stan-
dards by which human rights conditions should be measured. 145 
Like the human rights legislation before it, the Act defines gross 
violations of internationally accepted human rights to include: 
torture, cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punish-
ment, prolonged detention without charge and trial, causing the 
disappearance of persons by the abductions and clandestine 
detention of those persons, secret judicial proceedings, and 
other flagrant denial of the right to life, liberty, or the security 
of any person. 146 
Other "flagrant denials" include freedom of the press, freedom of 
religion, freedom of association and freedom of conscience. The 
list is not exhaustive: the definitional section states that these vio-
lations include, but are not limited to, the violations which follow 
it.147 The phrase "other flagrant denial" also allows a degree of 
flexibility to include human rights violations not specifically enum-
erated. 
The Act also offered further explanations of several of its 
human rights terms. The terms "detained" and "imprisoned" in-
clude, but are not limited to: incarceration in jails, prisons, labor 
reform camps, labor reeducation camps. and local police detention 
centers. 148 The term "forced labor" is defined as "all work or service 
14°Id. § 3(b)(3). 
141Id. § 3(b)(4). 
142Id. § 3(b)(6)-(7). 
14S Id. § 3(b)(8). 
144Id. § 3(b)(9). 
145Id. § 7. 
146Id. § 7(4). 
147Id. 
148Id. § 7(2). 
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which is extracted from any person under the menace of any pen-
alty for its nonperformance and for which the worker does not 
offer himself voluntarily."149 
The human rights standard provided by these definitions em-
bodies the protection of physical integrity and the political and civil 
rights determined by the United States Congress to be fundamen-
tal. l50 The elements of the standard reflect the philosophical un-
derpinnings of United States due process and individual rights. 
Their legitimacy in an international forum, however, is based on 
how much they reflect the customary international law of human 
rights, not on their philosophical origins. 
IV. "THE UNITED STATES-CHINA ACT OF 1991" AND CUSTOMARY 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 
The People's Republic of China is already bound to certain 
minimum standards of human rights under customary international 
law. The United States has tried to influence human rights in China 
by passing legislation that encourages change through conditions 
attached to the extension of MFN status. The imposition of such 
conditions has added authority if the conditions reflect what is 
already required of China under customary international law. A 
comparison shows that the conditions mirror customary law in sig-
nificant respects. 
A. Consistencies 
The human rights conditions in "The United States-China Act 
of 1991" are consistent with customary international law on a num-
ber of points. The conditions relating to the detention of demon-
strators comport with customary international law. The Act called 
for the release of citizens who were detained because of their par-
ticipation in the events of Tiananmen Square. 151 Many hundreds of 
demonstrators were detained without charge. 152 Such persistent ar-
bitrary arrest and detention violates customary international law. 153 
Tiananmen Square participants were exercising their right to 
text. 
149 19 U.S.C. § 1307 (1988 & Supp. 1992). 
150 Henkin, supra note 99, at 408. 
m H.R. 2212, § 3(a)(l). 
152 See supra note 73 and accompanying text. 
m RESTATEMENT, supra note 21, § 702(g) cmt. m; see supra note 75 and accompanying 
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freedom of conscience and nonviolent expression. The continued 
deprivation of these rights violates customary international law. 154 
The Act's demand for an end to forced labor also reflects 
customary international law. The Act called for China to cease 
exporting products "made by prisoners and detainees assigned to 
labor camps, prisons, detention centers, and other facilities holding 
detainees."155 Customary international law prohibits slavery in any 
form. 156 Convict labor may also fall under the prohibition of torture 
or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment. 157 
The Act called for an end to religious persecution.15s The Act 
demanded the release of "leaders and members of all religious 
groups detained, incarcerated, or under house arrest as a result of 
the expression of their religious beliefs."159 The consistent abridg-
ment of religious freedom violates customary international law. 160 
In order to comply with the Act, China would have to ensure 
that it does not engage in torture or other inhumane prison prac-
tices. 161 Torture or other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment is 
a fundamental human rights violation. 162 In addition to preventing 
these abuses, the Act asked that international human rights and 
humanitarian organizations have access to prisoners, trials and 
places of detention.163 This provision also involved China's consis-
tent denial of fair trials in criminal cases by making such proceed-
ings secret, a violation of customary international law. 164 
Additionally, both the Act and customary international law may 
reach beyond the scope of those violations specifically enumerated, 
so as to include other violations. The Act allowed for "other 
flagrant"165 violations to be added, just as customary international 
154 RESTATEMENT, supra note 21 § 702(g) cmt. m. Beijing has claimed that detentions 
made in response to the 1989 events in Tiananmen Square were not arbitrary, and that many 
people were involved in beating, smashing and looting. The government also used this phrase 
to describe similar detentions during the Cultural Revolution of the 1960s. MacFarquhar, 
supra note 73, at 42. Be that as it may, Amnesty International reports that hundreds of those 
detained are actually prisoners of conscience. See AMNESTY REpORT, supra note 60, at 1. 
155 H.R. 2212, § 3(b)(2). 
156 RESTATEMENT, supra note 21, § 702 cmt. e. 
157 !d. § 702 cmt. g. 
158 H.R. 2212, § 3(b)(3). 
159/d. 
160 See supra note 81 and accompanying text. 
161 H.R. 2212, § 3(b)(7). 
162 See supra note 64 and accompanying text. 
163 H.R. 2212, § 3(b)(6). 
164 See supra note 75 and accompanying text. 
165 H.R. 2212, § 7(4). 
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law may prohibit other "gross violations of internationally recog-
nized human rights."166 The rate at which these acts must occur 
before they are considered gross violations, however, is one gap 
between the Act and customary international law. 
B. Gaps 
While the provisions of "The United States-China Act of 1991" 
reflect customary international law to a large extent, the fit is not 
perfect. The gaps involve the demand for an end to interference 
with the freedom of the press and Voice of America broadcasts in 
China, and the rate at which gross violations must occur before they 
transgress customary international law. 
The Act called specifically for the removal of restrictions on 
"freedom of the press and on broadcasts by the Voice of Amer-
ica."167 The right to freedom of the press, while constitutionally 
protected in the United States, has not yet been recognized as 
fundamental by the international community.168 Similarly, the right 
of citizens to receive foreign radio and television transmissions has 
not yet become a part of customary international law. 169 Thus, for 
the present time, these freedoms fall outside the sphere of rights 
safeguarded by customary international law. 
The second gap concerns the scope of the Act versus the scope 
of customary international law. With the exception of certain spe-
cific violations-those so fundamental, they are considered jus (0-
gens-customary international law only precludes a "consistent pattern 
of gross violations." 170 The Act, on the other hand, does not place 
any such restrictions on the occurrence-rate of potential violations. 
The scope of customary international law, therefore, is narrower 
than that of the Act: a single gross human rights violation would 
invoke prohibition by the Act, but would not be sufficient to com-
promise customary internationallaw. 171 
166 RESTATEMENT, supra note 21, § 702(g). 
167 H.R. 2212, § 3(b)(4). 
168 See CUSTOMARY LAW, supra note 28, at 93-95. 
169 See id. 
170 RESTATEMENT, supra note 21, § 702(g) (emphasis added). 
171 Of course, the phrase "flagrant denial" as used in the Act could be interpreted the 
same way as "consistent pattern" in referring to gross human rights violations. If so, the Act 
mirrored customary international law on this point; if not, it is a discrepancy which could 
have been easily avoided by United States lawmakers, had they considered customary inter-
national law. Bill drafters could have consulted with the Office of the Legal Advisor before 
completing legislation involving international law and standards. In the United States, the 
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To change the language of "The United States-China Act of 
1991" in order to conform more closely with customary interna-
tional law would be to delete the provision demanding that restric-
tions on freedom of the press and Voice of America broadcasts be 
lifted, and to adhere to the narrower standard of "consistent pat-
tern" of gross violations currently embraced under customary in-
ternational law. Because most of the values held fundamental by 
the United States-protection of the physical integrity of the person 
and protection of basic civil and political rights-are already a part 
of customary international law, tailoring the Act to track customary 
international law more closely would weaken it to only a small 
degree. 
Closer adherence to customary international law would not 
allow the People's Republic of China to escape or avoid the Act's 
provisions by claiming that the conditions infringed upon its sov-
ereignty in violation of customary international law. China could 
not then validly assert that the Act's conditions were singularly 
requirements of the United States, because they simply reflected 
the customary international law binding all nations. Furthermore, 
because many of the human rights violations in China are so basic, 
the United States should address these concerns before exploring 
other rights violations not currently a part of customary interna-
tional law, such as freedom of the press. 
C. The MFN Status Debate 
Discussion of "The United States-China Act of 1991" involved 
heated debate between those who believed the Act would force 
China to recognize human rights, and those who felt it would simply 
antagonize the Beijing government. United States President George 
Bush recommended in early 1991 that MFN status be continued 
without restr~ction. He said conditions would isolate the government 
and help "the hardliners over the reformers."172 
Office of the Legal Advisor is a part of the Department of State. JOSEPH MODESTE SWEENEY 
ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL SYSTEM 29 (3d ed. 1988). 
The Legal Advisor has an obligation "to encourage respect for, and to improve the 
international legal system." [d. at 30. As the in-house international law expert, the Legal 
Advisor can counsel the executive branch to take action to change pending human rights 
orders or legislation to better conform with customary law and practice. Congress may also 
call on the Legal Advisor for "information or its views concerning questions of international 
law." Richard B. Bilder, The Office of the Legal Advisor: The State Department Lawyer and Foreign 
Affairs, 56 AM. J. INT'L L. 633, 641 (1962). 
172 Mitchell Locin, Senate OKs Limit on China Trade Status, CHI. TRIB., July 24, 1991, at 3. 
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On the other side of the debate, several of China's leading 
dissidents in exile urged that conditions be imposed.l7!l Shen Tong, 
one of the exiled students, said that denial of MFN status is the 
"most effective weapon available to influence Chinese government 
policy." 174 In 1990, the Beijing government released several 
hundred political prisoners prior to a similar debate over the ex-
tension of MFN status to China. 175 
Congressional discussion over "The United States-China Act of 
1991" was heated as well, reflecting the two opposing camps in the 
MFN status debate. Discussion in both houses did not break down 
strictly according to party lines. Although each side considered 
exactly what action the United States should take, if any, concern 
for human rights was tempered with concern for the Act's domestic 
implications. 
Favoring conditions to the extension of MFN status, Senator 
George Mitchell noted that a recent State Department report on 
China revealed that nothing had changed since Tiananmen Square 
with respect to human rights, and that it was time to implement a 
stronger policy.176 Senator Lloyd Bentsen continued, saying that the 
Act sends a message to the Chit:J,ese leadership which the Bush 
administration failed to send. 177 If China wants to continue current 
trade relations with the United States, he said, and "if it wants to 
be an accepted member of the international community, a member 
in good standing, then it has to change its direction on human 
rights .... "178 
Not all of the discussion was supportive of the Act, however. 
Senator Max S. Baucus took the opposite viewpoint, posing that 
withdrawal of MFN status would push China further into the hands 
The Bush administration put forth three major reasons for rejecting conditioned MFN status; 
China is "special" and must be treated accordingly; withdrawal of MFN status threatens the 
economy of Hong Kong; and China has geostrategic importance. Drinan and Kuo, supra 
note 3, at 38. 
175 Exiled Students Urge Bush to Accept Trade Conditions, WASH. POST, July 25,1991, at A31. 
174Id. On September I, 1992, Shen Tong was taken into custody while visiting his home 
in China. Merle Goldman, In China, Brutality vs. Boom Times, BOSTON GLOBE, Sept. 6, 1992, 
at A21. Reportedly, Chinese authorities arrested Shen because he held a press conference to 
announce "the establishment of a chapter of his Democracy for China Fund and for con-
tacting underground student and worker pro-democracy groups." Id. 
175 Exiled Students Urge Bush to Accept Trade Conditions, WASH. POST, July 25,1991, at A31; 
see also CHERRINGTON, supra note I, at 210. 
176 138 CONGo REc. S2132 (daily ed. Feb. 25, 1992)(statement of Sen. Mitchell). 
177 Id. at 2133 (statement of Sen. Bentsen). 
178Id. 
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of the government hardliners. 179 He argued that the debate is not 
over ends, upon which all sides seem to agree, but over the best 
way to effect those ends. 180 Perhaps the main opposition to the Act 
came from those who cited the potential effect on United States 
business interests should MFN status be conditioned. 181 In 1991, 
the United States exported over six billion dollars worth of goods 
to China.182 Particularly unmoving on this issue were those repre-
sentatives and senators from the so-called "farm states."183 
D. Fate of "The United States-China Act of 1991" 
Whether the conditions of "The United States-China Act of 
1991" would have worked to encourage reform by the Chinese 
government, helping the Chinese people suffering human rights 
abuses, remains a hypothetical question. President Bush vetoed 
"The United States-China Act of 1991" on March 2, 1992.184 
Though the House of Representatives voted to override the veto, 
the Senate fell short of the votes needed to override. 185 
After vetoing the Act, President Bush reiterated his position 
that human rights reform in China could best be accomplished 
through diplomatic pressure. 186 In a statement about his decision, 
he said. "Anyone familiar with recent Chinese history can attest that 
the most brutal and protracted periods of repression took place 
precisely when China turned inward, against the world."187 Among 
the diplomatic efforts were a meeting between Premier Li Peng, 
179/d. at 2134 (statement of Sen. Baucus). 
180/d. 
181 [d. at 2141 (statement of Sen. Murkowski). 
182 [d. The United States began economic relations with the People'S Republic of China 
in 1972 with the signing of the Shanghai Communique. K. HOLLY MAZE CARTER, THE ASIAN 
DILEMMA IN U.S. FOREIGN POLICY 114 (1989). A year after issuance of the communique, 
bilateral trade between the United States and China increased from $5 million to $95 million. 
[d. Formal diplomatic relations were established in 1979, when China first received MFN 
status. [d. at 116. By 1980, bilateral trade between the two countries had increased to $4.8 
billion. [d. at 117. 
18' Keith Bradsher, China Will Keep Trade Privileges, N.Y. TIMES, March 19, 1992, at A5. 
Senators from states with large agricultural communities opposed conditioning China's MFN 
status, "for fear China would retaliate against imports of food from the United States." [d. 
184 See supra note 3. 
185 Jim Mann, Senate Fails to Override China Policy Veto, L.A. TIMES, March 19, 1992, at 
AB. The Senate vote was sixty to thirty-eight, six votes shy of the two-thirds majority needed 
to overturn a presidential veto. [d. 
186 Keith Bradsher, Bush Vetoes Conditions on Trade Status of China, N.Y. TIMES, March 3, 
1992, at A7. 
187/d. 
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President Bush, and United States Secretary of State James A. Baker 
on January 31, 1992.188 At the meeting, Li unequivocally refused 
to commit China to any changes in its human rights policies. 189 
V. CONCLUSION 
The United Nations aspires to have all countries respect basic 
human rights. Although human rights have become a legitimate 
issue of international concern, not all states, either through written 
agreements or consistent recitation and practice, have yet embraced 
the rights articulated in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
or the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights as ab-
solutely necessary for a human life of dignity. Countries that con-
tinually violate basic human rights can still be held accountable, 
however, under customary international law. 
As far as human rights are concerned, "The United States-
China Act of 1991" required only that the People's Republic of 
China honor many rights that it is already obliged to respect under 
customary international law. Because the Act closely paralleled cus-
tomary international law, with minor exceptions, China cannot claim 
that the United States singled it out for special treatment. Elimi-
nation of those exceptions would bring such human rights legisla-
tion into complete accord with the standards of customary inter-
national law. The question for future action, then, is whether the 
United States should leave improving human rights in China to the 
vagaries of diplomatic contact, or whether the United States should 
support customary international law and its recognized obligations 
upon the world community. 
Lawrence M. Friedman 
188 [d. 
189 [d. In 1992, Congress again attempted to couple human rights conditions to the 
extension of MFN status in "The United States-China Act of 1992." S. 2808, 102d Cong., 2d 
Sess. (1992). Although the 1992 bill differed somewhat as to approach and deadlines for 
compliance, the human rights provisions were substantively the same as the 1991 act. See id. 
§ 3(IH4). The 1992 act, however, invoked the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 
which has not been accepted by the world community as customary international law in its 
entirety. See supra note 38 and accompanying text. 

